Abstract. In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.
Introduction
The characterization and comparison of the optimal policies, when each player sets its policy in a noncooperative manner or when all players coordinate their actions and set their policy jointly, are issues which have received considerable attention in the differential game literature. The gains from policy coordination have been shown in different applied contexts, for example, environmental and economic problems. These results have been established after both cooperative and noncooperative games have been solved completely.
In this note, we focus on the comparison of the total value obtained by the players when they follow either a cooperative or a noncooperative mode of play. More specifically, our objective is to see under which circumstances the total payoff under policy coordination is strictly greater than the sum of the individual payoffs in the noncooperative game. The question that we address is the following: Is there scope for cooperation in a particular differential game? In other words, is the cooperative surplus positive? The main contribution of the paper is that this question can be answered without the knowledge of explicit solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB ) equations.
The question of the inefficiency of the noncooperative solution was studied first by Lancaster (Ref. 1) and later by Hoel (Ref. 2) in a differential game between workers and capitalists. In both papers, the open-loop equilibrium qualifies also as a Markov-perfect equilibrium that depends on time only, leading to a quite simple proof. Our aim in this paper is to provide a general result, applicable to a wide class of differential games and for Markov strategies. We establish a sufficient condition in terms of the fulfillment of an algebraic inequality involving the partial derivatives of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables. The main advantage of our approach is that it allows us to deduce if the Pareto strategies are better than the closed-loop Nash equilibria without knowing the respective solutions of the HJB equations, but only using the properties of the functions which satisfy these equations. The method is applied to analyze the inefficiency of feedback Nash equilibria in two different economic differential games.
Description of the Game
An N-person noncooperative differential game is determined by the following expressions:
where y G(y 
Hence, the solution to the cooperative game can be obtained by means of the solution to the following optimal control problem:
where
Let V i , with iG1, . . . , N, and let W α , with α G(α 1 , . . . , α N ), be continuously differentiable functions, defined in the set [t 0 , T]BX, which satisfy the HJB equations and final conditions associated with the noncooperative and cooperative games, respectively.
Inefficiency of Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria
In this section, we center on the comparison of the global value that the players obtain when they coordinate their strategies and when they do not. More specifically, we study whether the global value associated with a cooperative mode of play is strictly greater than that obtained when the players play in a decentralized way, that is, whether ∑
, where u α is a feedback Pareto optimum and u* denotes a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game. This is an important issue; indeed, if this holds, noncooperation would lead to an inefficient result that would be improved if players cooperate. The next theorem allows to answer this question for the Markov-perfect Nash equilibria, without the explicit knowledge of the solutions to the HJB equations.
In the next result, 〈 · , · 〉 denotes the usual scalar product in ‫ޒ‬ n and ∇ is the gradient operator. 
with strict inequality for some subset
For all vectors ûG(û 1 , . . . , û N ), if (7) is an equality for all y and for almost every s∈ [t, T] , then the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is a Pareto optimum.
Proof. Let t ¤t 0 and x∈X, and let x be the trajectory associated with û, that is,
This function is absolutely continuous and therefore differentiable in almost every point of [t, T] . Let us define the function
Let > h(s) G(s, x (s)) ; therefore, the composition (W [t, T] . Applying the properties of the Lebesgue integral and taking into account the above representation of function g, one can deduce that, since g′ is defined and is not positive in almost all points of [t, T], the function g is monotonous nonincreasing in such interval. In fact, g′F0 in E t and then g(t)Hg(T), since g is strictly decreasing in a subset of positive Lebesgue measure.
To conclude, let us observe that
Given that g(t)Hg(T ), inequality (8) is deduced.
For all vectors ûG(û 1 , . . . , û N ), when (7) is an equality for all x and for almost every s∈ [t, T] , along the previous line it can be proved that g′ G0 and then
Therefore, the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is a Pareto optimum. ᮀ Remark 3.1.
(i) Since in (7) only the partial derivatives of W α , V i , and the function f are involved, the relationship between the cooperative and noncooperative games can be studied without the explicit knowledge of the solutions to the HJB equations. It is only necessary to know the behavior of the partial derivatives with respect to x, since the partial derivatives with respect to the time variable are related to the previous ones by means of these equations.
(ii) Notice that vector ûG(û 
In this case, lim inf 
Application to Economic Games
In this section, we apply the result of Theorem 3.1 to two economic differential games: a slight extension of the well-known Lancaster model and a transboundary pollution problem. These models show that our theoretical result can be applied to different types of games. The first game presents bang-bang solutions, while the second game corresponds to a linearquadratic specification. 
where α, β H0 and αCβG1.
The workers (first player) decide the portion of the output which they consume sY, where 0 ⁄s 1 ⁄ s⁄s 2 F1. On the other hand, the firms (second player) control which portion θY of the product they invest and also decide the labor supply L. We consider that 0⁄ θ⁄ 1 and 0 ⁄L⁄ µK, where the positive constant µ depends on the technology of the productive process. The objective of both players is to maximize their own consumption over a fixed period of time [0, T], taking into account the time evolution of the capital K. The game is specified completely by
It can be proved that, in the optimal solution,
LGµK.
The HJB equation for the first player reads
and V 1 denotes the value function of this player. The equation for the second player is
, and V 2 denotes the value function of the second player. Both equations have to satisfy the final condition
From the optimality conditions, one can show the following: First, singular controls s* Gd 1 and θ* Gd 2 can be excluded from the optimal solution; second, following a similar reasoning as in Lancaster (Ref. 1) , one can assert that, close to the final time, [t*, T], the optimal strategy is (s*(t), θ *(t))G(s 2 , 0).
We get three pairs of optimal strategies: 0) is played in the noncooperative game, while (s 1 , 1) is played in the cooperative game, inequality (7) can be written as
Choosing any value of s and θG0 in [0, T ], the left-hand side of the last inequality becomes (1͞2AW K )(1As 1 ), which is strictly lower than zero, since W K H1͞2 and s 1 F1. Then, satisfaction of inequality (8) is guaranteed.
On the other hand, when (s 2 , 0) is still played in the noncooperative game, but (d p 1 , 0) is played in the cooperative game, inequality (7) reads
Again choosing any value of s and θ G0 in [0, T] the left-hand side becomes identically null.
To sum up, in both cases, an efficient solution leading to a global consumption greater or equal than that associated with the Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed. 
is the net social benefits of the production Y i of country i and
is the social damage caused by the stock of pollution S. The constants α and δ denote the emission-output ratio and the depreciation rate of the pollution concentration. Let V i denote the value function of the ith player. The HJB equation for this player reads
Let W denote the value function for the cooperative game when the same weight α i G1͞N, iG1 Therefore, in any case it can be proved that the cooperative solution gives a larger welfare than the global welfare derived following a Nash equilibrium strategy.
